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Published on · 4 min read

The CSTO strips Armenia of its vote: Europe sees a pro-EU turn, the Caucasus sees the end of Russia's monopoly

On 11 November the CSTO suspended Armenia's vote. Seen from Tbilisi, this is not a swing to the West but a Caucasus with many partners, and a chance for Georgia.

On 11 November in Moscow, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) stripped Armenia of its voting rights and of its right to nominate candidates for senior posts. In Europe the story is quickly summed up: Yerevan is turning its back on Moscow and moving closer to Brussels. From Tbilisi, I read it differently. This is not a country switching sides. It is the Caucasus and Central Asia stepping out of a one-on-one with Russia and multiplying their partners. For anyone looking to invest in Georgia or set up a business here, that nuance changes how you read the risk.

What was decided in Moscow

The facts first. CSTO leaders applied Article 25 of the Charter. The official reason: Armenia has not paid its dues to the organisation’s budget for two years (TASS). The day before, Sergey Lavrov presented the draft decision, saying the suspension would last “until it fully repays its debt” (TASS).

Armenia has not been expelled. CSTO Secretary-General Taalatbek Masadykov made it clear: as soon as it settles its dues, it can be reinstated (The Moscow Times). Lavrov insists the door is “not being slammed shut”.

On the Armenian side, nobody tried to save face. On 5 November, Nikol Pashinyan said his country’s interest in the CSTO had “run its course” (Al Jazeera). He even said he would welcome expulsion. Armenia’s participation has been frozen since 2024. The underlying grievance is well known: the alliance did not move during the 2020 and 2023 wars with Azerbaijan.

The European reading: a country “going West”

In Brussels and in most European media, the story is simple. Armenia wants to join the EU, leaves the Russian military bloc, and Russia loses an ally. That is partly true. But this reading projects a Cold War logic, with two camps, onto a region that no longer works that way.

Three facts qualify it:

  • Armenia remains closely tied to Russia. It is still a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia keeps two military bases there. And Moscow has imposed sweeping bans on Armenian products this year (The Moscow Times). You do not exit a dependency with a press release.
  • On the same day, Pashinyan was in Antalya, Türkiye, for the opening of COP31 (Armradio). The symbol is not Brussels, it is Ankara.
  • Peace with Azerbaijan was negotiated in Washington, with the TRIPP route agreed on 8 August 2025. Not in Brussels.

The view from Tbilisi: the end of a monopoly, not a change of camp

What I see from Georgia is a post-Soviet space reorganising into multiple formats. Nobody is replacing one patron with another.

Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan left the collective security treaty back in 1999, as did Georgia. Uzbekistan rejoined in 2006, then suspended its membership again in 2012. In late September 2026, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Türkiye trained together in Karabakh and on the Caspian. In October 2025, Azerbaijan and four Central Asian countries had already held joint exercises without Russia (Al Jazeera). In mid-October, Uzbekistan’s president hosted US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a few months after attending the 9 May parade in Moscow.

That is the real trend: stay polite with Moscow, train with Ankara, sign with Washington, trade with Beijing and the Gulf. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain in the CSTO, but none of them puts all its eggs in one basket. Analyst Galiya Ibragimova calls the move “a demonstrative whipping” of Yerevan (Al Jazeera). Above all it is an admission: the CSTO now holds on to its members only through its rulebook.

What it changes for Georgia

Georgia belongs to no bloc: not the CSTO, not the Eurasian Union, not the EU, not NATO. This position is often presented as a weakness. In a Caucasus with many partners, it becomes a crossroads advantage.

In practice:

  • Armenian trade runs through Georgia. Georgia already carries more than 70% of it (CivilNet). If Russian–Armenian relations deteriorate further, the ports of Poti and Batumi and Georgian rail become even more central for Yerevan.
  • The Middle Corridor is getting stronger. The Turkic states, who met in Ankara at the end of October, now also cooperate on security. An Asia–Europe route that bypasses Russia needs stability, and Georgia is its unavoidable passage.
  • The risk is real too. The TRIPP route through southern Armenia will eventually offer an alternative to part of Georgian transit. And a Russia losing influence may respond with trade pressure, as it already does with Armenia.

What I take from it as an investor or entrepreneur

  1. Read the region as a network, not as camps. A project that depends on a single partner, Russian, European or Chinese, is fragile. A project that benefits from flows between several is robust.
  2. Logistics, warehousing, services for Armenian companies. That is where the shift shows first, in Tbilisi and on the coast.
  3. Watch three indicators: Russian trade measures against Armenia, progress on the TRIPP works, and Georgian transit volumes published by Geostat.

I live this reshuffle from Tbilisi, working alongside Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani entrepreneurs. If you are considering setting up or growing your business in the region, I can help you structure the project: business consulting in Georgia, or book a meeting.

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