Middle Corridor: while Europe debates Georgia, Asia is building the route that runs through it

Seen from Brussels, Georgia is above all a political file today. Relations are strained, and in 2026 the European Commission suspended visa-free travel for holders of Georgian diplomatic and official passports. From my office in Tbilisi, though, the last week of October told a different story, one of rails, quays and tonnes. If you want to invest in Georgia, that is the story to read closely: the Middle Corridor, the China–Europe route that bypasses Russia via the Caspian and the Caucasus, is changing scale.

Ankara, 30 October: the Middle Corridor changes scale

The 13th summit of the Organization of Turkic States took place in Ankara. Its members are Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with Turkmenistan attending as an observer. The figures announced were clear. According to Kazakhstan, freight on the Middle Corridor rose 30% in the first nine months of 2026, and transit 90%. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and the organisation’s members is approaching 40 million tonnes (Qazinform, Euronews).

Uzbekistan proposed a programme of 100 joint industrial projects and called for the corridor to become an integrated system with shared logistics hubs. Turkmenistan offered its port of Turkmenbashi for Caspian transit.

Two more signals came the same month. On 15 October, a trans-Caspian fibre-optic cable was commissioned in Baku. On 19 October, around a hundred Japanese representatives (government agencies, JICA and logistics firms) met in Tokyo to discuss the route. Japanese companies have already run trial shipments along it to test transit times, costs and customs procedures (Astana Times).

Georgia: bottleneck or hub?

All of this cargo ends up crossing a country of 3.7 million people: mine. The Georgian data keep pace:

• Ports: 9.7 million tonnes in the first half of 2026 (+22%) and 409,397 TEU (+9%), the best first half in a decade (Trend).
• Rail: Georgian Railway carried 6.9 million tonnes in the first half (+10%). In the second quarter, transit made up almost 60% of volumes (RailFreight).
• Baku–Tbilisi–Kars: since 2 June 2026, the line’s capacity has risen from 1 to 5 million tonnes a year (Astana Times).
• Exports: USD 6.15 billion from January to September (+19.6%). Exports of goods made in Georgia are growing much faster than re-exports (Trend / Geostat).

On the Turkish side, Ankara launched a three-lot tender in October to rehabilitate and electrify the Divriği–Georgian border line, with bids due on 22 December (RailFreight). Türkiye is spending around USD 10 billion to remove the corridor’s rail bottlenecks (Türkiye Today).

The real pressure point is at sea. Poti handled 404,760 TEU from January to July (+7%) and is reaching its capacity limit. The Anaklia deep-sea port was relaunched in July under a landlord model: the state funds the infrastructure, and private operators fund the terminals. The first phase costs about USD 1.1 billion, USD 700 million of it public, for a depth of 17.5 metres. Dredging has started and operations are targeted for 2029. The work is moving forward, but Maersk (APM Terminals) says it is not interested for now (Investor.ge).

What the European reading leaves out

The dominant narrative in Europe presents Georgia as a country “drifting away”. That is a legitimate debate, and I do not play down the political risk. But it hides a simple fact: geography does not follow electoral cycles. The corridor is being financed by Ankara, Astana, Baku and Tokyo, together with the World Bank, the ADB and the AIIB.

Europe is financing it too. Brussels aims to mobilise up to EUR 12 billion for the route through Global Gateway (Türkiye Today). In other words, Europe is betting on a route while criticising one of the countries it has to cross.

For an entrepreneur, then, the right question is not whether Tbilisi is aligned with Brussels. It is whether the goods go through Georgia. Today the answer is yes, and increasingly so.

The limits, in figures

I am not selling dreams. The corridor is still a niche: 4.5 million tonnes in 2024 (CivilNet), with about 5.5 million expected in 2026 according to Azerbaijan’s transport ministry (Report.az). That is small next to Asia–Europe sea freight.

Three risks are worth watching:

1. The return of Suez. Since September, Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd have been moving several services from the Cape route back to the Red Sea, even though the Houthi threat remains (Al-Monitor). If the sea route becomes safe again, the corridor’s rates will come under more pressure.
2. The TRIPP route. This 42 km route through southern Armenia, agreed in Washington on 8 August 2025, is not yet under construction. Most analysts expect Georgia to keep its central role: it already carries more than 70% of Armenia’s trade (CivilNet).
3. Anaklia. Several industry players are sceptical of the 2029 timeline.

What I take from it as an investor or entrepreneur

• Logistics and warehousing. Demand follows volumes, around Tbilisi, Poti and Kutaisi. The free industrial zones in Poti and Kutaisi deserve a case-by-case analysis.
• Trading and processing. The growth in domestic exports shows that producing or assembling in Georgia for the Caucasus and Central Asia is becoming credible. Georgia’s tax regime, which taxes profits only when they are distributed, encourages reinvestment.
• Commercial property. Offices and housing for logistics managers in Tbilisi will follow this trend, more slowly than the cargo flows.
• Time horizon. I think in terms of five to ten years, with two scenarios: a safe Suez and an unstable Suez. A project that only works in the second one is not a good project.

Are you considering setting up along this route, or investing in it? I can help you structure the project on the ground: business consulting in Georgia, or let’s book a meeting.